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Crisis in Russia-EU energy  
relationship
Following the summit of Khabarovsk
The EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk on 21/22 May 
2009 was determined mainly by the subject of  energy 
security but yielded more or less no result. The EU-
Russia relationship seems to have arrived at a new low, 
as there are different positions on quite a number of  
issues. The Russian proposal for a new security archi-
tecture has so far met with little agreement within the 
EU. On the other hand, the new EU project of  an 
Eastern partnership is regarded by Russia as a project 
competing for the post-Soviet space. However, it is 
the issue of  energy that has made the two sides adopt 
a course of  confrontation since the gas conflict at the 
beginning of  the year 2009. The interruption in the 
supply for Europe of  nearly three weeks has once 
more fanned the debate within the EU on the diver-
sification of  energy supply and has reinforced the 
trend towards promoting alternative energy sources 
and pipeline projects. This has put the gas industry in 
Europe under even more political pressure, especially 
as it has been under growing scrutiny by the European 
regulatory bodies for years anyway.
EU liberalization policy in the energy sector
The EU Commission has been driving its unbundling 
and liberalization policy especially in the gas sector 
for years, aimed at breaking up the influence of  a few 
large groups and introducing more competition for 
the benefit of  the customers. At the same time, energy 
policy within the Union is still determined very much 
by national views; a situation the Commission aims to 
change with its policy of  liberalization. The Third En-
ergy Package, adopted by the European Parliament on 
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The Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict of  early 2009 has inflicted sustained damage on the trust between 
Russia and the EU. Whereas the Russian side criticizes Brussels for not exerting sufficient pressure on 
Kiev and for putting the same blame for the escalation of  the conflict on Gazprom as on Kiev, the critics 
within the EU feel confirmed in their warning of  too great a dependence on Russian energy. Both the Rus-
sian suggestion for a new energy framework agreement as well as for a Eurasian energy forum met with 
little support within the EU. On the other hand, the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin has called into 
question, as a matter of  principle, the Russian signature under the Energy Charter Treaty. At the same 
time, Russia is continuing to develop its bilateral energy relations with individual EU member states with 
the Nord Stream and South Stream projects. At an international gas conference that was conducted by 
the DGAP Russia-Eurasia Center on 19 May 2009, it emerged that despite the high degree of  mutual 
dependence and the serious effects of  the financial crisis on the entire energy sector, neither side is ready 
for compromise at the moment. Russia and the EU should reconsider their energy policy and demonstrate 
more readiness for conciliation. It remains the supreme goal to de-ideologize energy policy and to turn it 
into an important pillar of  strategic bilateral relations.
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22 April 2009, envisages the separation of  grid opera-
tion and generation of  energy. The originally planned 
complete ownership unbundling of  the energy compa-
nies and their electricity and gas transmission networks 
had been weakened by compromise. Meanwhile, the 
member states are able to choose from among three 
possible options, in which there is not only the com-
plete separation but also the possibility of  the energy 
groups remaining the owners of  the grids and having 
them operated by independent companies. In contrast 
to this policy of  unbundling, the aim of  Russia and 
especially of  Gazprom is to be able to offer the entire 
value-creation chain also on the European energy 
market in the future. This is what the Russian govern-
ment wants to achieve through a new legal framework 
agreement on energy cooperation. This includes 
long-term agreements with the purchasers, guarantees 
for investments and access to the attractive European 
end-customer market.
Russian counter proposals
Also as a reaction to the gas crisis of  January 2009, the 
Russian side has presented two concepts that are to 
replace the Energy Charter and consider more strongly 
the interests of  Russian companies. At the Russian-
German Forum on Fossil Raw Materials in St. Peters-
burg on 27 March 2009, the President of  the Russian 
gas company, Valerii Yazev, presented the concept of  a 
Eurasian energy forum to an international audience for 
the first time. This forum is to consist of  all the major 
energy producers of  the Euro-Asian region, act inde-
pendently of  the respective national governments and 
place the transit of  raw materials under international 
control. Apart from this concept hailing from the Rus-
sian gas industry, the Russian presidential administra-
tion published proposals for a new Energy Charter on 
21 April. These call for a new universal international 
energy document that is to replace the Energy Charter. 
The fundamental principles of  this agreement are the 
equal responsibility of  recipients, suppliers and tran-
sit states of  energy resources for energy security, the 
maintenance of  state sovereignty concerning national 
resources, the unimpeded access to international en-
ergy markets and the protection of  existing and future 
investments in this area. Furthermore, guarantees are 
demanded for the transit of  energy resources and 
products, which strengthens particularly the rights of  
the producing countries.
It is especially the transit protocol of  the existing 
international Energy Charter Treaty that is being 
criticized by Russia, as this would mean the loss of  the 
monopoly over the pipelines held by Gazprom. With 
its new proposals for an international energy treaty, 
Russia is attempting to strengthen its own position and 
to play a more active role in the energy debate with the 
EU. Fundamentally, the existing structures and thus 
the monopoly position of  Gazprom for the delivery 
of  raw materials from the post-Soviet space is to be 
protected. Russia wants to leave the current supply 
contracts untouched and distribute the risk of  supply 
failures evenly among the exporters, transit countries 
and recipients. The Russian side finds fault in the EU 
for setting up rules with its energy policy without hav-
ing included supplying countries such as Russia suf-
ficiently in the negotiations on drawing up these very 
rules. Furthermore, Russia feels treated unfairly by the 
energy policy of  the EU. The Vice Chairman of  Gaz-
prom, Alexander Medvedev, criticizes that, on the one 
hand, Russia is held responsible for the interruptions 
in supply of  2006 and 2009 and that, on the other 
hand, projects for diversifying energy supplies to Eu-
rope such as Nord Stream and South Stream are being 
criticized within Europe as increasing the dependence 
of  Europe on Russia. It is a fact, however, that the EU 
only depends on gas supplies from Russia in a share of  
25 percent. Russia, in contrast, exports more than 80 
percent of  its energy to Europe.
Conflict surrounding Ukraine
A major contentious issue between Russia and the 
EU is that of  how to treat Ukraine. The declaration 
signed between Brussels und Kiev on 23 March on the 
modernization of  the Ukrainian pipeline system met 
with harsh criticism from Moscow, as it did not include 
Russia. Representatives of  the Russian government 
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and Russian companies raised the point that it was not 
possible to modernize the Ukrainian pipeline system 
that channelled 80 percent of  Russian gas supplies to 
Europe without the participation of  Gazprom. The 
company Gazprom stressed that this pipeline infra-
structure manufactured in the Soviet Union was syn-
chronized completely with the Russian system and that 
neither could function independently from one an-
other. The cost for the modernization amounts to US 
$ 5.5 billion according to the Ukrainian government, a 
sum that is to be supplied by international financiers. 
Indeed, it seems to make sense that a consortium con-
sisting of  European, Russian and Ukrainian companies 
should modernize, maintain and develop further the 
Ukrainian installations. It has to be considered that the 
Ukrainian side does not want to put this infrastructure 
under Russian control and that a consortium should 
also comprise several non-Russian companies.
A new gas conflict?
The Russian leadership and Gazprom have been warn-
ing of  a renewed gas crisis with Ukraine for weeks. On 
the one hand, this line of  argument is aimed at stress-
ing the importance of  the own projects (Nord Stream, 
South Stream) for European energy security and at 
meeting the criticism from the EU member states con-
cerning the too heavy dependence on Russian supplies. 
On the other hand, there are indications that Ukraine 
is really facing insurmountable payment difficulties. 
The Ukrainian gas monopolist Naftogaz has used up 
all of  its own gas reserves due to a lack of  funds over 
the past months and has not been able to re-fill the 
stores again. In the first quarter of  2009, Naftogaz 
only purchased 2.5 billion m3 of  the 35 billion m3 of  
gas ordered. In addition, Naftogaz has to repay US $ 
500 million of  a foreign loan in September 2009. Dur-
ing a meeting of  the prime ministers of  Ukraine, Yulia 
Timoshenko and Russia, Vladimir Putin, no agreement 
was achieved on financing the debts and the neces-
sary reserves for the winter season. Prime Minister 
Timoshenko had enquired about a US $ 5 billion loan 
in Moscow already in February, in order to restore the 
solvency of  Naftogaz. It emerged that despite exclud-
ing the intermediate agent Rosukrenergo, there was 
still no clarity established on the amount of  the debts, 
the handling of  ordered but not accepted deliveries 
and payment modalities. As the Ukrainian position is 
going to remain solid until the elections scheduled for 
January 2010, interruptions in the supply cannot be 
excluded for the winter ahead.
Options for EU action
What shall the EU do? The EU cannot step aside and 
stay out of  the energy relationship between Russia and 
Ukraine, as its member states are the ones who are go-
ing to bear the brunt of  any renewed interruptions in 
the supplies. Ukraine is in a precarious economic and 
political situation, which it will not be able to maneu-
ver out of  on its own. In order to secure long-term 
supplies through Ukraine, the solvency of  Ukraine 
itself  needs to be restored. This requires at least a 
partial privatization of  the Ukrainian energy industry 
(Naftogaz is 100 percent owned by the state), as well 
as higher domestic prices for energy, the promotion of  
energy efficiency and renewable energies. It remains to 
be seen whether the planned presidential elections will 
really lead to a stabilization of  the domestic political 
situation. However, the EU should put forward long-
term offers to Ukrainian politics, e. g. joint projects in 
the area of  energy efficiency and thus promote the 
modernization of  Ukrainian economic and energy 
structures. At the same time, it is not very promising 
to exclude Russia from such important strategic proj-
ects as the modernization of  the Ukrainian pipeline 
system. With the participation of  Russian companies 
in the modernization of  the Ukrainian infrastructure, 
these could be included in the responsibility. Thus a 
lighthouse project could be created serving the im-
provement of  the energy relationship between Russia 
and the EU as a whole.
Russia, Norway and Algeria will remain the major 
gas suppliers of  the EU for a longer period of  time. 
According to more or less all scientific forecasts, gas 
consumption will rise in the EU; and Russia, with the 
greatest gas reserves worldwide, is a supplier there is 
DGAPaktuell 2009/4 
Crisis in Russia-EU energy  
relationship
no alternative to in the medium term. It is important 
to drive on the diversification of  routes and the devel-
opment of  LNG terminals. Furthermore, the relations 
with the supplier countries should be developed in 
the long term, in order to create greater security. The 
secure delivery of  gas and oil should be guaranteed 
also through legal treaties entered into by the supplier 
countries, which would need to be financed through 
a higher gas price. They should be held liable for any 
interruptions in the supply. The gas crisis has made 
clear that a review is necessary of  the European and 
in some countries also of  the national security systems 
for energy. Energy should play a greater role in the 
foreign relations of  the EU. Brussels should adopt 
this subject more, in order to be able to act as a more 
influential player. This would add authority to projects 
such as Nabucco and open up new scope for negotia-
tion vis à vis the Central Asian countries.
Entwinement and Juridification
The global financial crisis has once more underlined 
the mutual dependence of  Russia and the EU in the 
energy sector. The decline in European economic 
output, connected with a lower consumption in raw 
materials and a drop in prices, hits the Russian energy 
industry and thus the income of  the Russian state 
directly. Over the first three months of  the year 2009, 
Gazprom’s gas deliveries to Europe declined by just 
under 40 percent as compared to the same period last 
year. At the same time, the share in the European gas 
market has dropped from 25 to 18 percent. This devel-
opment also has something to do with the rigid pricing 
policy pursued by Gazprom as compared to other 
competitors. Thus, the group has secured the monop-
oly concerning Central Asian deliveries with high price 
agreements, which are difficult to limit again now.
According to information from the company, Gaz-
prom expects its income to collapse by at least 45 
percent as compared to the previous year 2009. How-
ever, the group requires enormous financial funds in 
order to conduct its large-scale investment projects. 
At the moment, Gazprom confirms the continuation 
especially of  its strategically important projects such 
as Nord Stream, South Stream and the development 
of  the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea. The 
planned investments for 2009 amount to US $ 30 
billion. At the same time, Gazprom has foreign debt 
of  just under US $ 50 billion. The estimated cost for 
the first leg of  Nord Stream stands at EUR 7.4 bil-
lion. Apart from the Hermes guarantee in the amount 
of  EUR 2 billion, Gazprom enquired with the Ital-
ian exporting agency SACE about a suretyship of  up 
to EUR 2.14 billion in May 2009, due to problems 
on the international lending market. The cost for 
South Stream will increase massively with the planned 
doubling (from 31 bn. to 63 bn. m3) of  the capacity. 
Whereas Gazprom quotes a price of  EUR 8.6 billion, 
Western experts expect the cost to be in the range of  
EUR 22 to 25 billion.
It becomes clear that the Russian gas monopolist does 
not only require cooperation and technical know-how 
but even more urgently western loans and investments. 
Only close cooperation and a further integration of  
the Russian and European gas industries are able to 
guarantee European energy security in the long run. It 
seems to be all the more important not to put forward 
political arguments on the subject of  energy but rather 
to develop joint projects. The modernization of  the 
energy infrastructure and supply of  Ukraine suggests 
itself  as such a joint strategic project.
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